Who’s Who in the Line of Succession
Chief Executive (CE) Mr. Edmund Ho will complete his second and final term in 14 months, and a new CE will be selected by June or July or August of next year. Nevertheless, the eyes of the public – and those of other politicians – will be focused on the new CE candidates much earlier in the coming year. They will follow the selection process as it unfolds, paying close attention to the political background, ideology, administrative experience and governing style of each possible successor. Edmund Ho’s government will gradually adopt the role of watching and waiting, his effective governance fading from Macau’s political arena by the beginning of 2009. Who will follow him as the next CE? That becomes the most critical issue for both the Central Government and local citizens.
Choosing the new CE is a matter not only for the local Selection Committee but for the Central Government and the Basic Law, as well. Candidates who wish to qualify at the vetting stage should, in principle, be both supported by the Central Government and accepted by the local people. (The word “supported” is understood here to mean “endorsed”.) The first Hong Kong and Macau CE selections revealed that the Central Government’s criteria for endorsement were the candidate’s possessing a sound family connection with key personnel in the Mainland, service experience on the Executive Council and good friendship with the leadership. Though this policy remained unchanged in the second Hong Kong and Macau CE selections, the mechanism might no longer be valid in the case of a shift in core leadership.
That being said, though the new Hu-Wen Chinese leaders tend to be more realistic and pragmatic – traits observable beginning with the SARS settlement on through the several massive corruption scandals in recent years at the level of senior party membership – a change in Central leadership does not imply that the previous CE selection process will be fundamentally altered, only that a certain degree of modification is bound to happen.
To mingle the pragmatic policy of the new leadership with the rigid practice of party principles, a potential new CE candidate should possess certain prerequisites. First, he should be highly trusted by the Central Government, ideally having undergone and passed a loyalty and political correctness scanning process. Second, he should have a high degree of local popularity, meaning he should be universally accepted by the local peoplehis constituency. Third, he should have a sound educational background, optimally having been nurtured by Mainland-related institutes since childhood and possessing a degree from an overseas university to indicate his world vision. Fourth, he should have substantial connections with Mainland governmental political organisations – the higher the governmental level attained, the greater his prospects for being selected. Fifth, he should be impartial with respect to the business sector, and it may be a negative factor to have a close connection with business tycoons. Sixth, he should have a demonstrated capability in public sector management. Seventh and most important, he should have a clean and transparent background, guaranteed to be scandal-free behind his open personal profile. Taking all these prerequisites into account, the primary qualifications for a CE candidate can be grouped into four major elements, namely, political reliability, local popularity, administrative capacity and a clean record. As for the first element, the Central Government will find the candidate more reliable and will more easily be able to classify his political ideology if he possesses an official position in the Mainland political establishment, such as a membership in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or the National People’s Congress (NPC), for example.
Regarding the second element, local popularity can be tested through routine surveys, but that is not the usual practice in Macau. The best way for a possible candidate to acquire popularity is to gain as much public exposure as he can, by organising a social group, sponsoring community activities, participating in calls to charity and maintaining a good relationship with the media. These aims are not so difficult to attain if he doesn’t
hesitate to spend his resources on them. As to the third element, the best way to demonstrate administrative capacity is to occupy a position in a government policy bureau. The position can either be in the form of civil service attachment or appointed membership on the Executive Council. The experience of former Hong Kong CE Mr. Tung Chee Hwa and that of current Macau CE Mr. Edmund Ho as members of the Executive or Legislative Councils before the CE selection set a precedent: that an “ideal” candidate can come from the ranks of such a governmental organ, even if he was not a well-trained civil servant. That being said, a background as a veteran civil servant like that of Hong Kong CE Donald Tsang would certainly be an advantage.
The fourth element is crucial due to the fact that fighting corruption is a core policy of the Hu-Wen government. Anyone wishing to receive the Central Government’s blessing should essentially be able to display a capacity for clean and corruption-free leadership. Under this premise, anyone with connections to the business sector would have to make an extra effort to prove his impartiality, integrity and trustworthiness. Having a background in civil service or community activism will be a benefit, and under these circumstances, being a politician or businessman will not provide an advantage in the campaign for the CE seat.
The above selection criteria can easily be applied, in retrospect, to explain the appointments of Hong Kong ex-CE Tung Chee Hwa and the current Hong Kong and Macau CEs, Donald Tsang and Edmund Ho. Taking for granted that these prerequisites are still the Central Government’s criteria for selecting its ideal CE, we can use them to weigh the following possible CE candidates likely to run in 2009’s Macau CE election campaign.
José Chui Sai-peng, who was seen as the hottest successor to Ho, particularly before early 2007, is cooling down in popularity. He is a local-born elite and an engineer trained in America. He has been appointed to several official Mainland positions including a membership in the CPPCC of Guangzhou and a membership in the NPC. He is also part of local key organisations including the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Macau and the Consultation Committee of the Macau SAR. Nevertheless, he was involved in a number of government construction projects, including the problematic project at Tap Seac Square and others during Ao Man Long’s tenure in office. Perhaps because of his prominent family background and professionalism, he was seen for a long time as the most likely successor to Ho in 2009. However, the invisible bribery in construction and engineering projects highlighted by the Ao Man Long scandal has undermined his popularity and personal charisma to the degree that he can no longer be considered a hot candidate, or even a dark horse, for the 2009 CE election. In fact, the public’s previous expectations for his candidacy may have been a sincere misunderstanding, simply because he can fulfil only a small portion of the pre-requisites.
Ho Iat-seng, an extremely low-profile politician in the Macau political arena, is now classified as the hot one for the 2009 CE election. He was born in Macau and received tertiary education in the Mainland, not to mention that his appointment as a member of the NPC Standing Committee endows him with a unique assent from Central Government. As is the case with Edmund Ho and Tung Chee Hwa, it is said that his father played a role for communist China, especially during the closed door policy, which helped his family build up a special relationship with Central Government. He is also a member of the Executive Council, which has enabled him to earn popularity and accumulate governing experience. His low profile gives him a particular advantage in today’s Macau because the media cannot so easily report negative press. His only disadvantage is his close connection with the business sector, which remains an uncertainty in his future.
Cheong U, Commissioner of the Commission Against Corruption, is the dark horse in the 2009 CE election. Although he does not possess all the prerequisites, his veteran civil service background, clean image, free of connections to the business sector,
and higher departmental reputation compared with other government departments, along with, most importantly, the arrest of Ao Man Long and family which resulted in unprecedented prison sentences, all earn him a great deal of credit from both Central Government and the public. To Beijing, Cheung may be an appropriate person to pursue the principles of clean government and zero tolerance for corruption, and his training as a civil servant and loyalty record would ensure the implementation of Central Government policy. His limited knowledge of gaming industry management doesn’t hurt his prospects, since, as was the case with Ho, the Central Government can instruct him in solving the major problems.
Ho Chio Meng’s appointment after the Handover as Procurator-General of the Public Prosecutions Office and his position as Deputy Commissioner in the High Commission Against Corruption and Administrative Illegality, held since before the Handover, make him a possible candidate now, in the wake of the Ao Man Long case. Perhaps the public desires a neutral and just CE to curb the notorious atmosphere of corruption in the community. His judicial background, however, as well as the insufficient “support” he has received from the North, will diminish his prospects in the election. Further, the lack of prerequisites in his personal background eliminates the possibility of his candidacy.
Sam Hou Fai, President of the Court of Final Appeal, is another who suddenly became a possible candidate after the Ao case. However, his personal background doesn’t live up to the prerequisites, and he is too young and inexperienced in Macau’s political arena. What is more, the Ao case has left a lot of lingering controversial issues for the public to debate, which damage his impartial status in the community.
Fernando Chui Sai-on, who was appointed the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture after the Handover, is said to be a possible candidate. Perhaps his family ties and American university education contribute to that. Although his background is quite similar to Chui Sai Peng’s, his ordinary performance in Macau’s economy, gaming industry and political socialisation cannot give him extra credit.
It is interesting to hear that Mr. Francis Tam Pak Yuen, the Secretary for Economy and Finance, and Ms. Florinda da Rosa Silva Chan, Secretary for Administration and Justice, are also on the list of possible candidates. That seems to indicate the CE should come from the ranks of civil service, but first of all, they do not possess the prerequisites. Second, they lack outstanding performance and popularity. Political observers would find it unusual if they receive the minimum nominations.
From the above analyses of possible CE candidates, one easily notices the poverty of political leadership in Macau. That may be due to the political isolation suffered by the Macau people for centuries and the fact that their minimally integrated socio-political mentality drives them away from social oriented sentiments, leaving them with a sense of helplessness. Further, the united front efforts conducted by the patriotic societies since the 1960s have been successful in making the people of Macau obedient to the patrons, following their line without a fight. It is ridiculous to find that locals can only name the possible CE candidates because of public exposure, and that nearly all the CE hopefuls hold a public position. Also worrisome are the difficulties the next CE will surely experience, since the Macau people are no longer such obedient citizens as they were under the Portuguese regime. The frequent protests in recent years, the benefit conflicts among members of the gaming industry and the increasing demands on the civil service have alarmed Beijing over the efficacy of governance in Macau. If the third CE cannot cope with these changing circumstances, he may have to step down after Hu’s regime.
Bruce KWONG is an Assistant Professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.