Balance of Power Politics on Korean Peninsula
The decision by the Bush administration to remove North Korea from the list of terrorist states, in return for Pyongyang’s decision to disable a key nuclear facility, may prove to be more than just another move in an endless game of chicken.
Last week, North Korea stated unequivocally that U.N. inspectors would be allowed full access.
North Korea complained that eight of 11 agreed steps in disabling the nuclear facility at Yongbyon had been taken, but had received only about half of an agreed 1 billion tons of oil aid in exchange.
The current agreement resulted from intense negotiations in 2007 involving China, Japan and Russia as well as South Korea and the United States.
The high stakes involved are self-evident. The 1950-53 Korean War took an estimated one million lives, brought direct combat between American and Chinese forces, and devastated the Korean Peninsula. In U.S. politics, the conflict demolished public support for the Truman administration and fed anti-communist hysteria.
Another war would devastate the Koreas once again, greatly disrupt international politics, and might go nuclear. Additionally, the U.S. is now mired in Iraq, with precious few forces to spare for any additional war.
Last year, two developments were
distinctive. First, international financial pressure spearheaded by the United States was instrumental in forcing flexibility on the rigid communist regime.
The Bush administration declared Banco Delta Asia (BDA), based in Macau, a renegade institution assisting illegal financial activities by Pyongyang. U.S. businesses were banned from dealing with BDA, and others followed suit. Macau government authorities froze $25 million in North Korean funds.
Washington then offered to facilitate return of the funds to Pyongyang in return for nuclear flexibility. This transfer has been carried out by BDA, reportedly with assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the central bank of Russia and a small private Russian bank, the Far East Commercial Bank.
Second, in the wake of this nuclear-financial negotiation, the Pyongyang regime in June 2007 launched a missile over the waters between South Korea and Japan. According to intelligence officials in both countries, the missile had a range of approximately 100 kilometres.
This was the third test in two months, and reflected North Korean propensity to flex airborne muscle toward Japan, the hated former colonial ruler. There have been more missile tests this year, most recently in March and this month.
Such moves may be a sign of North Korea infighting. Cracks in the rigid totalitarian face of the regime could complicate but also facilitate efforts to reach a nuclear agreement. Trigger-happy missile launchers
may force more moderate factions to rally around Pyongyang’s current efforts to reach a fresh nuclear understanding with other powers.
There has also been Bush administration infighting. President Bush has been consistently supportive of agreement, which directly reflects the efforts of the State Department and, specifically, chief negotiator Christopher Hill.
Bluntly rejecting criticism of the agreement by John Bolton, his former U.N. ambassador, and other neoconservatives, Bush underscored the importance of `more than one voice.’
President Bush’s praise of multilateral diplomacy, and the importance of allies, has particular resonance in this part of the world, where South Korea, China, Japan and Russia along with the U.S. have played roles in the current breakthrough.
Over the years, Pyongyang has become masterful at creating crises, sometimes approaching the brink of war, only to step back, usually in return for substantial economic concessions.
For Washington and allies, negotiation has been frustrating, at times agonizing, but war has been averted and stability maintained.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished professor at Carthage College in Wisconsin.